Sarbanes-Oxley: Section 404 and the Death of the Small Public Company by Cutler, M Gregory
1Sarbanes-Oxley:  
Section 404 and the Death of  
the Small Public Company 
 
M Gregory Cutler 
 
Abstract
With the approaching implementation of § 404 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, there is widespread criticism of the 
enormous costs of complying with the section.  Although § 
404 arguably improves investor confidence by making the 
financial condition of a company more transparent, 
businesses argue that the costs are simply too high.  The 
question remains as to whether high costs are a good enough 
reason to expose investors to the type of fraud Sarbanes-
Oxley protects, or whether there are public policy reasons 
to ease the burdens. 
 This note examines the effects of § 404 on small 
businesses, and argues that public policy not only permits 
the SEC to ease the burden for small firms, but demands it.  
The high compliance costs implicate public policy by 
effectively pricing small businesses out of the public 
capital markets.  Recent discoveries about the importance 
of small business to the economy reveal that this has the 
serious potential to send industry and the economy as a 
whole into ruin. 
 Moreover, the effects of § 404 on investor confidence 
are uncertain at best, with reason to believe that the 
financial transparency it creates does as much harm to 
investors as it does good.  This is especially true for 
small businesses, which do not have as much of an impact on 
investor confidence as the Enrons and Worldcoms.  As a 
result, it is imperative that the SEC remove some or all of 
§ 404’s burdens on small businesses. 
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3I. Introduction 
 When Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(“Sarbanes-Oxley”) 1 over the Enron debacle, debates raged 
over the impact the new, stringent rules would have on 
public companies.2 These debates have been reinvigorated 
almost four years later as the most costly and 
controversial section of the Act, § 404, is implemented.3
While on the surface this fight may seem like Corporate 
America’s attempt to protect its profits, in reality it is 
more than that: it is a fight for the survival of the small 
public company, for the economy’s elusive resurgence, and 
essentially even for the American dream. 
 As a response to the financial reporting scandals of 
Enron and others, Sarbanes-Oxley is a gallant attempt to 
protect the public at large from big bad business.  
Ironically, though, big business has taken the new 
requirements in stride while many small firms are facing a 
mortal wound.  The debate now is to what extent small 
public companies should be made to pay the same costs as 
big ones. 
 On the one hand, financial reporting fraud is a real 
problem, and some kind of response was necessary.  Enron 
proved that.  Further, a search beneath the big-business 
publicity of Enron and Worldcom reveals that financial 
4reporting fraud is not limited to handful of bad apples; it 
impacts the entire market, regardless of firm size.4 In 
fact, smaller firms are more likely than larger ones to 
commit other types of fraud, such as pump-and-dump and 
Ponzi schemes.5
On the other hand, implementing Sarbanes-Oxley as is 
would cost so much to small businesses that it has the 
serious potential to eliminate their access to the capital 
markets.6 Without access to the public finance market, 
small businesses cannot grow, and the economy will lose the 
advantages in technology and efficiency that it has enjoyed 
for most of the past century.  Perhaps more importantly, 
overburdening small companies could carry significant 
social and political consequences, as the American public 
has always considered the promotion of small business 
important to American capitalism and democracy. 
 This debate raises several, seemingly disparate public 
policy issues.  Should investors be exposed to fraud just 
to protect a quaint American ideal?  Are there compelling 
public policy reasons to promote small public companies?  
Does the Act actually further any fundamental concerns of 
the public?  This note examines the government policies 
affected by Sarbanes-Oxley, and analyzes whether it 
furthers or detracts from the fundamental concerns of 
5society at large.  Part II briefly explains the major 
provisions of the Act and their intended purpose.  Part III 
examines the public policy concerns affected by the Act.  
Part IV presents the evidence to date on how the Act has 
affected these concerns, and how it will affect them in the 
future.  Part V weighs the competing interests, and 
concludes that burdens of Sarbanes-Oxley must be reduced 
for small firms.  The final parts address the possible 
solutions and the prospects for change. 
 
II. Overview of Sarbanes-Oxley 
 Congress enacted Sarbanes-Oxley as a direct response 
to the financial reporting frauds of Enron, Worldcom, and 
others.7 It gave the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) a mandate to adopt a broad array of rules, 
ostensibly to prevent this type of fraud from occurring in 
the future.  Following this mandate, the SEC has adopted 
rules enhancing financial disclosure, improving the 
independence of auditors, and requiring directors to 
certify financial reports.  Further, the Act itself 
enhanced the criminal and civil liability of directors, 
created a new administrative agency to govern auditors, and 
gave the SEC increased enforcement powers.  While the 
primary focus of the current Sarbanes-Oxley debate is on § 
6404, each of the other provisions of the Act has a 
substantial effect on the policy issues that § 404 
implicates.   
 As a preliminary matter, it is important to point out 
that Sarbanes-Oxley makes no relevant distinction between 
large and small companies.8 The Act applies to any issuer9
required to make periodic reports to the SEC.10 As a
result, if a small business wants to go public it will have 
to comply with the stringent requirements of Sarbanes-
Oxley. 
 A. Section 404 
 The primary focus of Sarbanes-Oxley critics, and of 
this note, is on the § 404 requirements regarding internal 
controls over financial reporting.11 In particular, § 404 
requires that management include in its annual report to 
the SEC (Form 10-k or Form 10-KSB) an assessment of the 
effectiveness of these controls.12 The section also 
requires the company’s external auditor to attest to, and 
report on, management’s assessment.13 In its implementation 
of this section, the SEC also required disclosure of any 
material weaknesses in the internal controls, a requirement 
not mandated by § 404.14 
The ultimate goal of this section is to ensure the 
accuracy of financial reports, and thus improve investor 
7confidence.15 There had been some concern among regulators 
that a “‘corner-cutting’ culture” had developed among 
public companies in an effort to reduce costs, which 
resulted in internal controls unable to adequately prevent 
financial reporting fraud.16 The hope is that the new 
controls requirements will cast a broad enough net to catch 
most fraudulent activity, and thus make investments less 
risky.17 Logically, investors would be more willing to 
invest in a safer venture.18 
Largely ignored at first,19 § 404 is now the source of 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s most staunch criticism.20 The primary 
concern is the enormous costs, which are mostly 
attributable to fees associated with the auditor assessment 
and attestation requirements.  As a result of the new rules 
affecting auditors, the accounting industry has responded 
to its § 404 duties with what some commenters believe is 
undue vigor.21 Part III of this note will discuss the 
effects of § 404 more fully. 
 B. CEO and CFO Certifications 
 Section 404 is not the only provision causing 
substantial public dissent.  The provisions initially 
thought to be the most controversial were § 302 and 906, 
which require a company’s Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) 
and Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”), or persons serving 
8similar functions, to certify as to the accuracy of the 
company’s financial reports.22 Before, CEOs and CFOs at 
least publicly claimed that it was rare for them to review 
periodic reports; they would be prepared by the company’s 
lawyers and accountants, and the managers would simply sign 
off on them.23 The result was that it was harder to pin 
criminal liability on the individual managers.24 In recent 
trials of pre-Sarbanes-Oxley frauds, some executives have 
escaped liability by characterizing themselves as oblivious 
to the contents of financial statements.25 Sarbanes-Oxley 
has taken that argument away. 
 Now, § 302 and 906 make the CEO and CFO sign a sworn 
statement that they have reviewed the reports, and that 
they fairly present the financial condition of the 
company.26 This makes it much easier to pin Rule 10b-5 
liability, the SEC primary weapon against fraud, on these 
managers.  Before Enron, individuals generally were 
“primary” violators of 10b-5 only if a material 
misstatement or omission was directly attributed to that 
person at the time of dissemination.27 In effect, the 
certifications force them to make a public statement, 
specifically attributed to them, stating that the financial 
reports are accurate.  This makes them primary violators 
for any fraud in the reports, liable under rule 10b-5.28 In
9addition, the Act added a new crime, making it criminal 
just to violate the requirements of § 906.29 This allows 
the Justice Department to prosecute without worrying about 
those pesky 10b-5 requirements. 
 The debate over the Act’s certification requirements 
raises issues that deserve a fuller treatment than this 
note can provide.  To what extent should CEOs and CFOs be 
made accountable for fraudulent reporting by their company?  
Should they have to pay for the actions of a rogue employee 
if they had no practical way of preventing them?  Also, too 
much time spent on fraud prevention would take away from 
their primary duty: managing a profitable corporation for 
the benefit of its shareholders.30 It will suffice for this 
note to say that certification has had a profound effect on 
the accountability of managing officers. 
 C. Criminal and Civil Penalties 
 In addition to casting a wider net to catch defrauding 
managers, Sarbanes-Oxley also enhanced how much that net 
could sting:  The Act aggressively enhanced both criminal 
and civil penalties, and handed the SEC more powerful 
enforcement tools.  The maximum penalty for criminal 
securities fraud is now twenty years, up from ten.31 
Maximum fines were increased from $1,000,000 to $5,000,000 
for natural persons, and from $2,500,000 to $25,000,000 for 
10 
corporations.32 The maximum penalties for mail and wire 
fraud were also increased,33 as were those for violations of 
the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”).34 
The Act also added entirely new crimes.  One is the 
certification failure provision discussed above.35 Others 
include alteration or destruction of documents,36 
destruction of corporate audit records,37 and attempt or 
conspiracy to commit mail fraud.38 
Although the Act did not directly increase civil 
liability in this way, it does help investors actually get 
the damages due to them.  First, civil damage awards for 
securities violations now survive bankruptcy.39 Second, 
under the Fair Funds provision, any civil penalties the SEC 
receives for a violation can be given to victims of that 
violation.40 
Complementing the changes in accountability are two 
sections giving additional authority to the SEC.  One 
grants the Commission the authority to temporarily freeze 
“extraordinary payments” made during an investigation.41 
The other allows the SEC to prohibit any person who 
violates securities antifraud provisions from serving as 
the director of any public company.42 
D. Accounting Changes 
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 One significant part of Sarbanes-Oxley is its impact 
on the accounting profession, and more specifically the 
relationship between public companies and its independent 
auditor.  Much of the blame for Enron was placed on Arthur 
Anderson, Enron’s auditor, for being either unwilling or 
unable to keep Enron’s management within the bounds of the 
law.43 Most commenters believe that accounting firms simply 
had no leverage over their big business clients; if they 
insisted on proper internal controls to ensure accurate 
financial reporting, their clients would simply look 
elsewhere for auditing services.44 
The Act takes several steps to combat this problem.  
First, it established the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (the “PCAOB”), whose task is essentially to 
audit the auditors.45 Second, it enhanced the independence 
of a public company’s audit committee.  The committee must 
now be composed solely of outside directors, and has sole 
authority with regards to the auditor and the audit.46 
Third, it enhanced the independence of the auditors 
themselves.  To complete any public company audit, an 
auditor must register with the PCAOB,47 cannot perform any 
other function for the issuer,48 and must rotate the person 
heading the audit.49 While these changes have shifted the 
balance of power over financial reporting to the 
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accountants, allowing them to be better “gatekeepers,”50 the 
vigor with which the profession has responded has had a 
significant effect on costs of Sarbanes-Oxley compliance.51 
E. Other Provisions 
 Section 404 was not the only change to disclosure 
requirements.  Other changes include disclosure of off-
balance sheet transactions,52 disclosure of whether the CFO 
is subject to a code of ethics,53 disclosure of changes to 
any such code of ethics,54 and disclosure of whether there 
is a financial expert on the audit committee.55 Each of 
these disclosure items was a response to what Congress 
believed to be widespread weaknesses in corporate 
governance.56 In addition, the SEC now requires financial 
projections to follow certain accounting standards,57 and 
has accelerated the reporting requirement for any change in 
stock ownership by an insider.58 
Other provisions only affect business indirectly.  For 
example, the SEC implemented Part 205, dealing with an 
attorney’s ethical duties, to comply with § 307 of the 
Act.59 The Act also instituted new protections for 
whistleblowers and informants.60 Along with the changes to 
the accounting industry,61 these elements address the notion 
that the so-called “gatekeepers” of public companies, their 
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employees, accountants and attorneys, were either unwilling 
or unable to keep management in check.62 
Congress has attacked financial reporting fraud with a 
broad edged sword in response to a handful of highly 
publicized scandals.  Did they overdo it?  Part III 
examines the fundamental public policy considerations 
affected by this attack.  The final Parts examine the 
effect that it has had, and will have, on those concerns. 
 
III. Public Policy Considerations 
 Does Sarbanes-Oxley further or detract from public 
policy?  The short answer is both; it arguably protects 
investors from fraud,63 but makes it cost-prohibitive for 
most small businesses to enter the public market for 
financing.64 The long answer requires an analysis of the 
fundamental concerns of society affected by the Act, and 
then an examination of how greatly the Act affects them.  
This part discusses the competing public policy concerns of 
investors and small business, why they are important, and 
how fundamental they are to society.  Part IV examines the 
extent the Act furthers the concerns of investors, and 
detracts from the concerns of small business.   
 A. Investor Protection 
14 
 In general, the purpose of Sarbanes-Oxley is the same 
as that of the ’33 Act and the ’34 Act: to protect 
investors by ensuring that their investments do not succumb 
to fraud.65 Regulation serves two vital protective 
functions, one socio-political and the other economic.  The 
primary concern is the normative, social idea that fraud is 
simply wrong.66 
This ethical consideration has been the primary 
driving force of regulation since its inception.  
Securities regulation originated to protect the gullible 
American public from traveling swindlers, who offered 
“speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many 
feet of ‘blue sky.’”67 Today this ethical ideal is still 
prevalent.68 Even in an age wherein economics affects 
decisions far more often than ethics, there is still a 
sense that investors must be protected from fraud simply 
because society believes it is wrong to defraud investors. 
 It would be a farce, however, to say that the only 
benefit of regulation is to society’s sense of right and 
wrong.  Regulation is also vital to the economy.  With such 
a tenacious watchdog as the SEC and its regulatory 
authority, investors can be more confident that the 
securities they purchase are, if not sound investments, at 
least not shams.  If investors know the securities they 
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purchase are less likely to involve fraud, they will value 
their investments more, and thus will invest more.69 This, 
in turn, stimulates the economy as a whole and benefits 
everyone.  In an unregulated, caveat emptor regime where 
investors have no information about the validity of an 
offering, the market would eventually become flooded with 
scam securities.70 Investment would dry up and the economy 
would stagnate.71 
The concerns served by regulation are unquestionably 
vital.  The importance of protecting the economy is well-
documented and is beyond the scope of this note.  The 
normative value of preventing fraud is no less important; 
certainly it is as socially valuable as preventing any 
criminal activity. As such, government policy must ensure 
that securities offerings are adequately regulated.  The 
Enron scandal caused a mass belief that the current 
regulations were inadequate, and that something like 
Sarbanes-Oxley was necessary.  At the very least it was 
certain that reporting fraud existed in all types of public 
companies.72 Even if the previous regulations were truly 
inadequate,73 however, the Act’s effectiveness at furthering 
these public policy concerns is questionable, while its 
negative impact on other concerns is both certain and 
substantial.74 
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 B. Small Business 
 Without question, Sarbanes-Oxley negatively affects 
the ability of small firms to turn to the public market for 
financing because of the substantial increased costs of 
compliance.75 Accordingly, two questions must be answered 
to determine whether the Act implicates public policy:  
First, to what extent should government policy promote the 
growth and well-being of small business?  Second, how 
important is a small firm’s ability to enter the public 
capital market?  As it turns out, the ability of small 
businesses to go public is vital not only for their own 
growth and well-being, but for the growth and well-being of 
industry and the economy as a whole.   
 1. Economic Importance of Small Business 
 The economic importance of small firms has been both 
ignored and misguided until quite recently.76 For years, 
most scholars attributed the dominance of the American 
economy to the development of big business.77 Particularly 
during the cold war, many economists even argued that small 
firms, which do not produce enough to take advantages of 
economies of scale,78 were actually a drain on efficiency.79 
These analysts advocated any public policy that favored 
high industry concentration, with more large corporations 
and fewer small firms.80 With the advent of revolutionary 
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new theory and methodology, however, analysts have 
completely changed this belief. 
 Examining the organization of industry as a dynamic 
institution as opposed to a static one, economists now 
understand why small firms continue to be prevalent despite 
their supposed inefficiencies.  Small and young companies 
are a primary source of innovation,81 and are a significant, 
if not the primary source of new jobs.82 Viewed in a 
dynamic frame, these aspects of small companies make them 
essential in the industrial renewal process as agents of 
change.  Large firms have such large and complex 
infrastructures that they are simply not able to adapt to 
changes in technology.  Instead, individuals with “a given 
endowment of new knowledge” are better served by 
entrepreneurship than by employment in large firms.83 
Without small business, this new knowledge would be under-
utilized and industry would not evolve as fast as it has in 
recent years.84 
This result makes empirical sense.  Especially in 
high-technology fields, most break-through innovations come 
from start-up companies.  Even in the lower-technology 
steel industry, new “mini-mills” entering the market have 
become profitable despite the fact that the incumbent giant 
mills had been losing money for years.85 Classical 
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industrial organization theory could not explain how firms 
could enter a market where there were no excess profits.86 
Economists now know that the success of small firms like 
these mini-mills is due to their flexibility and their 
ability to incorporate new knowledge in ways large firms 
simply cannot.87 
As such, the importance of small firms is that they 
allow industry to the development and growth.  Any policy 
that stunts the growth of small business has the potential 
to hurt the economy as a whole.  Nevertheless, this is not 
the only compelling reason to support small business; 
protecting small business is also important to American 
society itself as a symbol of America’s identity and the 
American Dream. 
 2. Sociopolitical Importance of Small Business 
 While the economic importance of Small businesses is 
just now being uncovered, the socio-political importance 
has been recognized since colonial times.  Small firms 
represent “‘a cornerstone of American democracy,’” and are 
seen as an institution that offers everyone a chance at the 
American Dream.88 In fact, the small firm is the single 
most important vehicle for dissolving class barriers and 
promoting more equal economic opportunity.  Since this 
country’s inception, entrepreneurship provided Americans 
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from every social background social mobility.89 Small 
enterprises are particularly important for minorities and 
immigrants to integrate into American society.90 This has 
also been important for women, who have faced and continue 
to face discrimination that hinders their ability to 
compete for jobs.91 
Small business is not just important for these select 
groups, however; it is important to the entirety of 
American society.  Even when big business was thought to be 
the driving force of the economy, the Government still felt 
pressure to protect the little guy.92 This is why there was 
such vigorous antitrust prosecutions following World War 
II,93 and again in recent years.94 This is also why the 
Small Business Administration survived President Reagan’s 
attempt to get rid of it in the 1980s.95 The well-being of 
small business in America is indeed a driving political 
force.96 It is no wonder that the SEC, which initially 
refused to ease the § 404 burdens for small businesses,97 is
now facing tremendous pressure to change its position.98 
Whether to protect the economy or keep the American 
Dream alive, government policy must ensure that small 
businesses continue to thrive.  As one prominent economist 
put it:  
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The policy implications are clear.  The crucial 
barometer for economic and social well-being is the 
continued high level of creation of new and small 
firms in all sectors of the economy by all segments of 
society.  It should be the role of government policy 
to facilitate that process by eliminating barriers to 
entry and exit, lowering transaction costs, and 
minimizing anticompetitive behavior by large firms.99 
Sarbanes-Oxley affects the ability of small firms to 
develop by effectively keeping many of them out of the 
public capital markets, and financially handicapping those 
able to stomach the costs.100 This affront to the economic 
and social well-being of this country could only be 
justified if the corresponding investor protection either 
is more important or offers more benefits than it costs.   
 C. Protecting Access to the Public Capital Markets 
 Whether for economic or political reasons, government 
policy should promote the growth and well-being of small 
firms.  What is less obvious is how important it is for 
small firms to be able to go public.  The primary benefit 
to firms is that they can better finance their business, 
complete key acquisitions and grow.  Public offerings offer 
a more valuable security to the public than exempt 
offerings,101 and offer them to a much larger market.102 The
result is a much higher demand for their securities.103 A
corollary to that is that managers have more incentive to 
start the ventures in the first place, since their own 
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stock in the company is more valuable if publicly 
tradable.104 Of course, depriving businesses of these 
benefits would only implicate public policy if it affected 
the public at large. 
 One way that better financed small businesses benefit 
the general public is that it improves the economy as a 
whole.  As discussed above, the importance of small 
business to the economy is that they are the seeds of the 
economy’s renewal process.105 Without public market 
financing, small businesses are less able to develop and 
market new technology.  In essence, making better financing 
available to small businesses keeps industry alive and 
kicking. 
 A second benefit is to investors; going public makes 
these companies more available to investors, and also 
increases the value of investing in them.  Although 
registered public offerings are not the only way to sell 
securities, exemptions to registration are highly 
technical, and an offering fitting one will not be 
available to most investors.106 Even if it is available, 
the lack of a public market and rules against resale reduce 
the security’s value.107 The result is that the ability for 
small business to go public benefits the investor as much 
as it benefits the business. 
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 The public policy concerns on both sides of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley debate are essential.  In a perfect world, 
neither should be furthered at the expense of the other.  
As it is, government policy must weigh the costs to one 
side with the benefits to the other.  The problem is that 
the Act has had a minimal effect on fraud prevention and 
investor confidence,108 while making it prohibitive for 
small businesses to enter the public finance markets.109 
This discrepancy mandates relief to small firms, at least 
from the most costly aspects of the Act.    
 
IV. The Effects of Sarbanes-Oxley 
 A. What Did Sarbanes-Oxley Accomplish? 
 The goal of Sarbanes-Oxley, and § 404 in particular, 
was to prevent financial reporting fraud and improve 
investor confidence.110 In its attempt to accomplish these 
goals, Congress designed the Act to improve the accuracy of 
periodic reports and increase management’s 
accountability.111 Ostensibly, controls on financial 
reports and a higher likelihood of being held accountable 
would reduce the incidence of fraud.  Less fraud, along 
with the impression that financial reports were more 
accurate, would supposedly boost investment.112 
23 
 Whether the Act accomplished these goals is unclear at 
best, with many commenters arguing that it has done almost 
nothing for either fraud prevention or investor 
confidence.113 The evidence that it is working is so far 
limited to anecdotes and inferences from indirect 
statistics.  For example, in 2005 there were a record 
number of amendments to financial statements.114 Some
commentators attribute this at lease in part to Sarbanes-
Oxley, particularly the recent implementation of § 404.115 
Supposedly, this is evidence that financial reporting is 
becoming more accurate.116 Others argue that these 
restatements do not represent the Act’s true target; 
rather, these are just the honest companies complying with 
the more stringent requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley, the same 
way they complied with the previous requirements.117 
Further, it is uncertain whether investors will 
characterize the increase in restatements as better 
accuracy in financial information, or as evidence of how 
inaccurate it was before the restatement.118 The effect on 
investor confidence is thus ambiguous.   
 Other potential evidence involves the mandated changes 
in corporate makeup; the new requirement that audit 
committees be made up entirely of outside directors has 
arguably increased the quality of boards of directors.119 
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Another more certain effect is that the Act has 
significantly changed the accounting profession.120 There 
is no question that auditors are being more thorough. 
Public company accountants now have the kind of leverage 
over their clients necessary to keep from being bullied, 
the way Arthur Anderson was by Enron.121 There are 
questions, however, as to whether this has had any actual 
effect on fraud prevention.   
 In fact, there is highly partisan debate as to whether 
any of the evidence indicates an effect on fraud.122 
Analysts claiming that it does are generally accountants or 
SEC employees, and so lack impartiality.123 Likewise, 
analysts claiming that it does not are generally pro-
business.124 Despite the disagreement, it will be several 
years before any data is available on the actual incidence 
of fraud.  The costs to small issuers, however, are far 
more certain. 
 B. What Were the Effects on Small Business?125 
1. The Pre-Implementation Outlook 
 The projected business costs of implementing § 404, 
especially with regards to small businesses, paled in 
comparison to the current figures.  The SEC estimated that 
the average company would require 383 hours to implement, 
assess, and audit internal controls, costing only $35,286 
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per company in outside professional fees.126 Further, the 
SEC concluded that the costs to smaller firms would be much 
less than that.127 It reasoned that due to the far less 
complex internal controls of smaller firms, § 404 costs 
would be significantly less.128 Finally, it assumed that 
most costs of compliance would be from designing and 
implementing the internal controls, which would be incurred 
in the first year.  Accordingly, it predicted that costs 
would be much less from the second year on.129 In fact, one 
study concluded that the imposition of such a rigid 
structure for internal controls would actually increase 
efficiency, since in recent years a “‘corner-cutting’ 
culture” among companies had led to lack of structure and 
hurt efficiency.130 
The public comments received by the SEC on the 
proposed rules firmly disagreed.  Most commenters argued 
that that the SEC vastly underestimated the number of hours 
companies would need to assess and audit the internal 
controls.131 One commenter even postured that the figures 
were off by a factor of 100.132 Moreover, many believed 
that the costs would not be proportionally lower for 
smaller firms.133 The SEC’s only response to these concerns 
was to only require § 404 compliance in the annual report 
(Form 10-k).134 
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 2. Actual Effects to Date 
 According to mounting evidence, the public comments 
were right.  Even ignoring the effects on small businesses, 
§ 404 implementation is lot more costly in general than the 
SEC expected: costs are about four times higher across the 
board.135 Also, many firms have now faced two years of § 
404 compliance, but the rapid decline in costs regulators 
expected has not happened.136 It is possible that the high 
costs still reflect implementation, and so will eventually 
decline.  The fact that the companies in this sample are 
“accelerated filers,”137 and thus are more experienced and 
better funded than most small businesses, makes that 
argument rather weak.   
 The most certain error, however, has been the 
disproportionate effects of § 404 on small public 
companies.138 Relative to their market floats, small-cap 
issuers will incur much higher costs than large companies, 
with some estimating that audit costs could triple, 
quadruple, or more.139 According to an interview with one 
securities law practitioner, the typical cost of compliance 
has risen from around $25,000 to $200,000 per year.140 Of
course, high costs alone are not compelling enough to 
mandate government policy; with the privilege of being a 
public company comes obligations to the public, and § 404 
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is part of those obligations.  Rather, it is the effect 
these high costs have on society and the economy that 
implicates public policy. 
 The key effect is that the cost of § 404 is keeping 
small businesses out of the public capital markets.  The 
last two years have been wrought with stories of small 
companies de-registering their stock, saying that the cost 
of being a public company has become prohibitive.141 One 
analyst’s study revealed that among the businesses that de-
listed, compliance costs swallowed nearly a third of the 
firm’s profits.142 Some analysts claim this is not the norm 
for small public companies, but the issue is not just 
whether current public companies can stay public, but 
whether small firms in the future will go public at all.  
Since the initial registration process is a significant 
cost in itself, the marginal cost of going public is 
significantly higher than that of staying public.143 The 
most troubling fact is that the number of small company 
public offerings has significantly decreased recently, 
despite the fact that the SEC has not yet implemented § 404 
for small firms.144 Thus, the mere possibility of having to 
face the costs of Sarbanes-Oxley in the future could be 
enough to damage the economy.  The bottom line is that § 
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404 is making it more difficult for small companies to go 
public, and to some extent to stay public.   
 Since § 404 is not yet in effect for small businesses, 
this evidence illustrates only the tip of the iceberg of 
what the Act will do not to only small business, but to the 
economy as a whole.  The most compelling reason to 
readdress the costs of § 404 is the economic impact it will 
have in the long run. 
 3. The Long Term Economic Outlook 
 The long run effects of Sarbanes-Oxley on the economy 
could be devastating.  Small businesses will face 
compliance costs that make it difficult, if not impossible, 
to enter the capital market.145 As such, small businesses 
will be under-funded and unable to develop.  With the 
modern understanding of the importance of small firms to 
industry,146 analysts can now predict the macroeconomic 
impact.  With small firms unable to capitalize on the new 
knowledge they bring to industry, they are unable to act as 
agents of change.  Essentially, if small business does not 
grow, the entirety of industry does not grow.  Technology 
does not develop.  Fewer new jobs appear.  Profits 
disappear.   
 Further, the decline of industry affects not only the 
involved businesses, but the economy as a whole.  The 
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stranglehold on small business puts the entire industry at 
a cost, efficiency and technology disadvantage to foreign 
firms.147 One of many macroeconomic implications is that 
the trade deficit, already a cause for concern, may get 
worse.148 If the burden on small business is not lifted, 
there will be at the very least a noticeable strain on the 
economy.  If small business is as important to America’s 
economy as recent studies suggest, that strain could lead 
to mass unemployment, a deflated standard of living, and 
the end of any industrial dominance this country may still 
have. 
 
V. Weighing Public Policy 
 Neither of the competing interests is compellingly 
more important or more fundamental than the other.  While 
the bias towards investors in the Act itself might suggest 
such a bias in Congress, it is more credible to believe the 
Act was a hasty reaction to a sudden surge in the call for 
investor protection.149 In fact, the evidence is that the 
political pendulum has swung the other way.  Even Senator 
Oxley has expressed a willingness to revise the Act.150 The
one thing this political fence-sitting demonstrates is that 
there must be balance between the two competing interests.  
Accordingly, a change in securities policy should only 
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occur if the total benefits outweigh the total costs.  
While neither the benefits nor the costs of regulation are 
easily quantifiable, and are fairly subjective depending on 
one’s point of view, it is undeniable that the benefits of 
Sarbanes-Oxley do not outweigh its costs. 
 First, even if the Act had accomplished all of its 
stated goals, the costs to small businesses and the 
resulting harm to the economy are so exorbitant that the 
ends do not justify the means.  As one analyst put it, “‘I 
think what ultimately is going to happen is in an attempt 
to capture a few bad guys, you not only extinguish the 
spirit of entrepreneurialism, you extinguish the spirit of 
capitalism, and you introduce the kinds of bureaucracy that 
will make America less competitive over time . . . .’”151 
While this trivializes the goals of the Act a bit, it 
reflects the reality that a boost in investor confidence is 
trivial compared to the economic impact the Act could have.  
Congress wanted to make sure that companies, even small 
ones, are not reporting profits that are not there.  Their 
solution: make sure there are no profits to report.   
 Another way to put it is in purely economic terms.  
The ultimate goal of congress, putting aside the ethical 
problem of fraud, was to stimulate the market by increasing 
investor confidence.  In doing so, it has crippled the 
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ability for most small firms to enter the market, and as a 
result has caused more harm to the market than good.  Even 
if investors are confident in financial accuracy, they now 
have fewer places to invest.  There is also reason to 
believe that any positive effect on investor confidence 
might be counterbalanced by an even larger negative 
effect.152 
Moreover, it is not even clear that § 404, the 
catalyst of these enormous costs, is either effective or 
necessary to protect investors from small business fraud.  
Some commenters believe that the extensive internal 
controls required by § 404 are just controls for controls’ 
sake, and do not actually prevent fraud any more than the 
internal controls currently used.153 They make more sense 
in large companies, where the financial structure is so 
complex that there needs to be a high standard for internal 
controls.  In small firms, even a drastically reduced 
standard for internal controls may be sufficient, since the 
structure is far less complex and the financial condition 
of the company is much more transparent. 
 Further, in the case of small firms it seems that 
other provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley are more than sufficient 
to accomplish the Act’s purpose.  Already there is an 
increased ability to prosecute executives, since the 
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certification requirement takes away the unawareness 
defense.154 Also, the enhanced independence of both the 
audit committee and the auditor take away the problem of 
leverage,155 which ensures that an audit will not be the 
tongue-in-cheek farce that it had been with Enron and 
Worldcom.  Auditors now have every incentive to report 
discrepancies to the audit committee, and have none to help 
management cover it up.156 
In addition, recent history strongly suggests that 
investor confidence is not affected by financial reporting 
fraud in small firms nearly as much as in large firms.  The 
type of fraud Sarbanes-Oxley was designed to prevent has 
existed for decades in smaller firms,157 but investor 
confidence was not substantially affected until a handful 
of large companies were caught.  The implication is that 
investor confidence is shaken far more by frauds in two or 
three Fortune 500 firms (in fact, enough to compel a 
Congressional mandate) than in hundreds of smaller firms.  
Sarbanes-Oxley may be necessary to protect investor 
confidence, but not when it comes to small issuers.  
 Another interesting, though troubling perspective is 
that at some point preventing fraud is no longer a 
compelling policy concern: “[l]ike it or not, a certain 
amount of fraud is optimal.”158 Eventually the cost of 
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preventing one more fraud becomes more than it is worth, 
even to the potential victim.  While shareholders prefer 
not to be defrauded, they also prefer to own stock in a 
profitable company.  That requires that management engage 
in profitable activity, and the time spent on fraud 
prevention is time taken away from such activities.159 From 
this point of view, it is possible that even investors feel 
the tremendous costs of § 404. 
 Even if investors do not consciously feel the effects, 
a certain amount of fraud on financial reports could 
actually be more important to investor confidence than the 
belief that the reports are accurate.  This seems to be the 
case for two reasons.  First, when companies include 
projections in their financial reports, missing 
expectations by even one cent per share can affect their 
market capitalizations by billions of dollars.160 This puts 
tremendous pressure on companies to falsify reports.161 The
argument can be made that such fraud is acceptable so long 
as the misstatement is (1) minimal, and (2) intended to 
assuage investor confidence and protect the capital market 
systems.  While no one could argue that Enron was good for 
investors, reporting earnings at $5.25 per share instead of 
$5.23, when done to protect the market, is hardly worthy of 
twenty years in a federal prison. 
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 Second, the corrections to financial reports caused by 
heightened sensitivity under Sarbanes-Oxley could actually 
hurt investor confidence.162 In 2005, a record of around 
1,200 such restatements were made, often leading to a sharp 
decline in stock price.163 Ostensibly, the heightened 
sensitivity was intended to improve investors’ belief in 
the accuracy of these reports,164 but the empirical results 
disagree.  Even though most of these restatements are 
“[h]onest companies . . . just doing their best to keep 
their books accurate,”165 the government’s efforts to 
prevent fraud have actually hurt investor confidence.  The 
implication is that there may be public policy reasons to 
let these companies hide minor discrepancies, ironically to 
protect investor confidence.   
 While no one could argue that fraud should be 
encouraged, at some point it becomes counterproductive to 
keep enhancing fraud prevention.  Sarbanes-Oxley is a prime 
example of a laudable goal costing more that it’s worth.   
 
VI. Possible Solutions 
 Analysts have proffered four potential solutions to 
the problem small firms have with § 404: complete 
exemption, partial exemption, better guidance, and reduced 
standards.  Some believed that the disproportionate impact 
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on small business was due to their inexperience, and to the 
lack of formal structure in their internal controls.166 
This implied two things.  First, once a formal, systematic 
set of controls was established, the costs to small 
business would decrease dramatically.167 Second, regulators 
could significantly reduce costs to small business by 
providing a clearer, more structured guidance as to what 
kinds of controls are required, and how to maintain them.168 
The problem with this theory is that they have already done 
that,169 and it has done nothing to calm the protests.  Even 
with a crystal clear understanding of what types of 
controls the SEC expects, the costs will still be 
astronomical.   
 What most small business advocates have promoted is 
complete exemption from § 404.  In fact, this is what the 
SEC’s own advisory committee has recommended for smaller 
firms.170 Since the impact of § 404 is undeniably greater 
than the intended benefits, this seems to be the best 
course of action. 
 It is also possible to reduce the impact of § 404 
without completely removing its protections.  The advisory 
committee recommended that, for mid-cap issuers, the SEC 
retain the requirements on internal controls but exempt the 
firms from having them audited.171 This would remove the 
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bulk of the cost while still requiring the rigid structure 
that the SEC believes will reduce the incidence of fraud.   
 Another possibility is reducing the requirements for 
internal controls while keeping the audit.  The much 
simpler structure of small firms’ financial organization 
justifies a much simpler structure in internal controls.  
If this can be done while maintaining adequate fraud 
protection, not only will it reduce the costs of 
implementing the controls, but also reduce the cost of the 
audit.  Whether this is possible and how it could be done, 
however, is beyond the scope of this note. 
 
VII. Conclusion and Prospects for Change 
 Public Policy demands that some measure be taken to 
reduce the Sarbanes-Oxley burden on small business, whether 
by exempting small firms from all or part of § 404, or by 
somehow making the requirements proportional to business 
size.172 The problem is that while the SEC is quick to 
issue hasty rules in response to a perceived threat, it is 
much slower to fix them once unintended and unduly harsh 
consequences have been revealed.173 
The Commission has not been completely deaf to these 
concerns.  In response to the public outcry against § 404, 
the SEC has taken small steps to address the concerns of 
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small issuers.  First, it delayed the compliance date for 
smaller firms by a year.174 The Commission believed that 
the delay would solve the problem by reducing the initial 
costs of implementing internal controls, which further 
demonstrates how vastly it underestimated the continuing 
cost burdens on small public companies.175 
Second, and perhaps more significantly, the SEC 
commissioned an advisory panel to assess the effects of the 
new regulations on small business and propose changes.176 
The panel recently came back with its recommendations, 
proposing to exempt companies with market capitalizations 
less than $700 million from having their internal controls 
certified by independent auditors, and exempt companies 
with less than $100 million in public float from § 404 
altogether.177 
Whether the SEC will respond, and respond adequately, 
is a tenuous proposition.  Commissioning the advisory 
committee is a good sign; at the very least the Commission 
recognizes that a problem exists and that some measure must 
be taken.  Another good sign is that when SEC Chairman 
Christopher Cox took his position last year, he expected to 
use whatever recommendations the committee had.178 In
general, the political pendulum seems to be swinging 
towards relief.  On the other hand, it has been months 
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since the advisory panel has come back with its 
recommendations, and while the Commission has acted quickly 
on its recommendations about foreign issuers, it has so far 
dragged its feet on the small business issue.  Also, most 
in Congress expect that the Act itself will not be 
amended.179 Change will have to come from the SEC itself, 
which has always been hesitant to relax its regulations.180 
The advisory committee’s recommendation is as broad a 
stroke to help small business as the Act was to protect 
investors.  The SEC has said before that, despite the high 
costs, it did not want to exempt small business from § 
404.181 The Commission must changes its stance, or else 
watch America’s small businesses falter, and bring the 
entire American economy down with it. 
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